Introduction

TAYYARARI
In the Iate i940's, the noıion of common or mutual interests was predominant and this was centrol to Turkey's joining the alliance. Since Turkey's contribution to the a1liance as substantial, it was seen not just as a Middle Eastem country, but as a European country. In the 1980s, however, the increasing attention to Turkey's role in the defense of the Persian Gulf underscored Turkey's importance. In this context, Turkey's role in deterring possible Soviet adventuresome in Iran and its potential role in proteeting the West's access to the oil in the Persian Gulf was highlighted in October 1982 by a US-Turkish co-Iocated operating base agreement 3
Collapse of the Soviet Union and the diffuse i)f the blocs haven't decreased strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey, in history, with its location maintained its importance and by the policies that she has pursued .. showed to be able to change balances in the reigon as well <lıS in the internatonal sy~.ıem. This reality will continues as geographic feature doesn't change.
"As the Could War wound down, Turke/s 'value' to the West began to be questioned in some drdes and this created considerable anxiety among the Turkish political leaders. The 1990 Gu/f crisis appeared at a juncture when these doubts were being openly discussed. Turkey's rapid and steadlast support of the Wesıern position may have been in part influenced by these t/wughts. Whatever the reason, Turkey once again regained its position as an indispensable a//y and expectations began to rise in the couıı18ry that a more central rle might be given to Turkey on dedsions involving the future shape of the Western a//iance, or at least of the region. ... as the new Western Coalition takes shape and takes charge of sec~irity po/icies of a signifieant part of the world. Turkey's position in the r,egion wi// be screngchenı?d,,4.
However, Turkey's difficullies with Europe, its increasingly dose association with the Middle East and (Asian mirıor) and the occasional reassertions of Islamic values in Turkey have combined to raise questions about the role that Islam may play in Turkey's political future. Turks have begl1n to question their idenli ties and to wonder whether they should consider themselves as Europeans first, and t8hen Middle Easterners, or the other way around 5 . Europe, 1946 -1952 (Brookline, Mass.: Hellenic Press, 1984 In fact, as noted earlier, Turkish attitudes remain heavily weighted toward the Westem political and economic system, to the extent that alternatiye opportunities in the Middle East, Central Asia and around the Black Sea are often promoted as vehicles for increasing Turkey's value to Europe and the United States 6 . But Turkey's relations with the West in general terms are not le~problematic. Hovewer, the relation between Turkeyand USA is becoming a desired level arter the radicalchanges'that ended the Cold war and East.West conflict Besides the customs union relation, the prospect for Turkey's joining Europe and the possibility of becoming a full member of the EU and Westem European Union (WEU) is getting high, but not soan.
On the other hand, the West, the United States and Europe that cooperated to contain Soviet Union and preserve peace and order in the Europe as well as in the world, started to stnıggle and rival each other in the regional and gobal policies. So, Turkish . political decision makers in the new period are face to face adilemma. Because, the interactions between these two major players, the United States and Europe, will dominate and especiall shape the future of the area. In this context, as noted by Kosic, "with the Kurdish issue being the single biggest problem for Turkey, and with its negatiye effeets on other problems such as the eeonomy and local politics, Turkey could not voluntarily allow the establishment of a de facto autonomous Kurdistan."13 Like many Arab states in the region, Turkey did not want to see Iraq desteoyed. if that seenano had been allowed to occur, it would have de stabilized the balance of power in the region and opened the door to expanded Iranian influenee. "The International community's failure to bring about a demoeratic Iraq has significantly undenninded Turkish domestic and foreign policy interests. On the other hand, the entire region would likely be thrown into grater dislocation in the even of the fragmentation öf Iraq." 14
In Turkey, sensitiveness of the public opinion to these matters is very high, And wrong policies adopted and pursued would affeet political structure and decision makers adversely. Unfortunately, American assassment of Turkey's position not refleeting the broader geopolitical realities of the post-cold war and inactivity of NATO in Bosnia leads many Turks to believe that Turkey's future would be guaranteed by a return to a strict reliance on Turkish strengths and the Islamic would. 15 However, the developments related to American support on the implementation of custom s union accord in the process of Turkey's integration to the West seemed to change this beHeying gradually.
In this context, the reassertion of Turkey's regioal role in the Balkans, around the Black Sea,16 in the Caucuses, Central Asia, and the Middle East would introduce an 12Sezer, "Turkish'Foreign Policy," p. 75. More problematic may be Anakara's desire for US backing in its policy toward' the Kurdish insurgency. A hard-line response to increasingly severe PKK atıacles could prove an impedimento to closer relations with the United States as well as Europe, whre Turkey's human rights record hils long been the subject of scrutiny. See, Lesser, ibid., p. 127. 130brad Kesic, "American-Turkish Relations at a erossroads", Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 99-100 14Sezer• 'Turkey's New Security Environment, ..." p. 163. 15Kesic, ibid., p. 106. 16The leading architect of the Blakck Sea project regards it as perhaps Turkey's first independent regional initiative -in fifty years, and one with potentially important security, as well as economic and political consequences. According to $ome observer in the West, if successful, it could raise the value of Turkey to its Westem parmers. In this context, Black Sea project has al$O been as welcome evidence that Ankara is developinı interests beyond the difficult issue of EU membership. Finally. active cooperation entirely new andless predictable element into relations between Ankara and Washington. Given the disinclination on both sides to view Turkeyasa Western gemiarme in regional maUers, the emergence of Turkeyasa regional power raises the important question of whether US and Turkish interests will be divergent or convergent over the longer tenn. According to same Turkish commentators, US interests in the stable evalutian of political and economic systems around the Black Sea and the Middle East, and in preventing the emergence ofregional hegemonies (eg., Iran) are broadly compatible with 1urkey's regional preferences.
As notOOby some American political scientists as well as Turkish scientists, Turkey's geographic position a1lows it to exert influcnce. in three different areas: the middle East, the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans. All thee have considerable Islamic populations and are experiencing social, political, and economic instabilitiy, which makes tham prime targets for infiltratian by Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, the presence of large Turkicspeakeng populations throughout the form er Soviet union fuelOOthe American belief that Turkey would be a major influence in this region. Playing on commonalty of language, Turkey would gain an advantage over lran's efforts at expending influence and at the same time limit Russia's influence among the NlS in Central Asia and Caucasus. So, the Bush and Clinton administrations especially viewed the Turkish model as an important influence in the political development of democratic and secular states in the Caucuses and Central Asia. 17 Finally, Turkey will seek US support for its regional policies and initiatives as part of an active strategic relatianship. Support for the Black Sea plan and Turkey's application for EU membership will be priorities for Ankara. 18
II. Turkeyand the Europe
As notOO by Eric Rouleau, a form er French Ambassador to Turkey, "Turkey's determination to become an integral part of Europe is the fmit of a national consensus that could seem strange in a Muslim country with nothing more than a geographical toehold in Europe. In fact, this aspiratian is not recent. The otlarnan Empire was itself a European power by virtue of vast possessions in the continent, and as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the reformist sultans sought 10 modernize the around the Black Sea centered on Arkara could serve as a counter weight to Greek influence in the Balkans and enhance Turkey's position as a regional economic power. it will possibly improve Turkey's longer-tenri prospects for EU membership. And it is not seen as an alternative to the EU in Turkey. Because. Black Sea project has many obstac1es to be a real integration movemenL 17However according to Kesic, the Americanh expectations for Turkey's roles in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans were never fully fulfilled, which added to the growing tension between tht: two nations over Turkey's violent response to an inereasingly active Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK So, by signing the Ankara Treaty, Turkey which explaing to be a member the European Community, finally in 1987 applied for full membership and expecting to be accepted to custon union with the European Union in the .first step.
For the first time in Turkish history, all major Turkish political parties, for different reasons, are unanimously agreed that Turkey should work toward becoming a full member of the Community. Some feel that the European connection would enhance the sustanance of a political democracy, others feel that it would provide insurance for the growth and the entrenchment of a free enterprise system. All express that a Turkey outside of Europe cannot even be thought of 20 .
, "There is basic political consensus in the country that it will be a good thing to become a member of the notable exception of the conservative religious Welfare Party, agree that the policy followed by the govemment on full membership is correct one."ı1 "Because, "the long term Iinkage with Westem Europe and the United States has affected closely the vision both the Turkish people and their govemments have about what type of society and what type of a future they would like to have. This vision includes a modem political democracy characterized by high levels of econoroic prosperity."22
To sum up, historical experience, economic relationships, perception of the world political system, and the resulting defense need, and the visions of the future have come together such that Turkey has come to view itself as a part of Europe, and it has persistently followed policies to achieve higher levels of integration with Western European countries and organizations. Af ter three doeuments adopted by the Turkey-EU assoeiation Council, Foreign Minister Murat Karayalçın said he welcomed the outcome of the Association CounciL. On the other hand, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, said thatthe signing of the customs union would not only lift customs barriers but also pave the way for political and financial integration with Europe24. '
Although economic in es~nce the decision to conClude the customs union was expected by officials from both sides to have wide ranging political and soeial ram ification s as well. For the Turkish side this means new steps in the direction of political integration with a view to realizing the evcntual aim of full memhership in the Union. For the EU side, on the other hand, there was a lucrative economic aspect as represented by the large market and the young and dynamic population of Turkey, all promising net henefits for European investors and businessmen. 25
On the other hand, some voices rose against the customs union. For example, according to Rıza Müftüoğlu, vice chairman of NMP: "The first steps Turkey should lake, hefore the customs union, is to strengthen the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, have a common market with the Turkic republis and to have ties with the Middle Eastern Countries." On the other hand, according to Oğuzhan Asiltürk, vice chairman of Welfare Party, and Doğu Perinçek, the leadcr ofg ultra-left wing Labor Party, the custom s union accord isa colonization agreemcnt and by entering the customs union, Turkey has aceepted the conditions to he a colony.26 However, EU countries have reasons that some of them stem from Turkeyand as well as some of them stern from themselves, for not to adopt Turkey as a full memher in the short mn. Let us look at those economic and politic reasons. First of all, the level of development of the Turkish economy is not sufficient and has important problem s to be solved possibly to integrate as a member of European Union. On the other hand, to be acceptcd as a full memher of EU is not realistis for Turkey with foreign debt of 60 billion dollars, infiation rate of 70 percent (ten times the EU average), hight rate of population (roughly 2.5 pereent annually, ten times the EU average) and unemployment rate of 30 percent (fife time the EVaverage). So "Chronic unemployment, the loss of purchasing power of wage earners and the erosion of the currency have already 100 some five million Turks to seek employment in Europe hefore Europe itself was struck full force for recession; Given the current unemployment' situation in the EC countries, Turkey's admission to the organization, which would 23Turan. Ibid. Besides, these economic deficiencies, in the ayes of Western politician, Turkey has a number of political probl~ms that, left unresolved, stand in the way of its EU admission. The first of these' is demoera~zation, which will have LO be completed before Turkey can join. The membersof the European Union appear LO be agreed that Turkey has been moving in the direction of more, notless demoeracy. At the moment, progress is not deemed to be sufficienl. "It should be moted that Turkey has achieved significant and rapid pogress despite three military coups d'etat since ı960. The multiparty system and an elected parliament bom quite satisfactorily and many of the public freedoms, particularly of the press, are to a great extent respected... This dos not change the faClthat certain effects of the military regime that roled from ı980 to ı983 have not been eliminated. The constitution and a number of laws and regulations significantly curtail other basic rights, or are worded in such a way as to enable the courts and the securily services to interpret them in an abusive manner."28
In this context, first, Kurdish problem affecting Turkey's all foreign relations should be resolved or kept under control. This problem increasinly dominates domestic politics. In undermines the credibility and stability of the government. It poisons the traditionaııy harmonious relations between Turkey's two main echnic groups, and in the long ron could even threaten the country's cohesion. According to him, a view that is mostly stressed in Turkey-that bccause of religion, the EU does not want Turkey be a member-is to some extent right.. Although it is not said publicly, unfortunately it is correct. 34 Whereas in Turkey, decision makers insist that religion should not affect political decisions as well as Tlp'key as well as Turkey's membership in the EU and WEU35.
In this context, it is very disturbing that Turkey is ıJing trying to be excluded from the efforts to construct a European defense identity around the WEU (by giying a non-voting, associate status in the organization). Uncertainty about the future role and . significance of NATO will reinforçe Turkish interesıs in emerging European defense arrangemenlS. Turkish exclusion from full participation in th€(SearrangemenlS would be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security role on the continenl. Also, Turkey's concers about ilS role in future European defense arrangemenlS have been of two sorts: The l broader fear of a security future cast largely in extra-European terms; and the narrow er concem that the European security umbrella would be extended to Greece but eXcl4de Turkey tt with serious implications for stability in the Aegean 36 . . . ı Whereas, both, in the overall NA TO defense and in the more specific European defense, Turkey stili occupies a strategic position thaı is discussed above. While existing amutual threat to both Turkeyand European counlries themselves, they didn't give enough military aid to re modernize and reconstruct ilS defense structure, now it is not realistic to thing that they give necessary support af ter dramatic developmenlS in the 
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system that changed quality of threat and seeurity perceives and with different foreign policy evaluations from Turkey toward Eastern Europe and Caucasus Region.
Another problem is that of the states of relations between Turkeyand Greece. The problem is multi-dimensional, and containsh within it the Cyprus problem, that the delimitation of the territorial waters, the air space and the continenta1shelf in the Aegean, the marking of the borders of the Flight Information Region, fortification of Greek islands in the Dodecanese and eastern Aegean. Beyond these issues is the separate but related question of the status and treatment of minorities; the residual Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul; and the more substantial Muslim (and predominantly Turkish) minority in Greek Thrace. 37 Other membersof the Community express their fears that Turkish-Greek problems should not become an internal problem of the Community and ttıat problem s should be cleared hefore Turkish membership is considered. From the perspective of EU, the Greek-Turkish conflict should not jeopardize the integrity and interrupt deeision making mechanism of the Organization.
Above all, Turkish relations with the West have been most seriously affected by the continuing dispute over Cyprus. In this context, acording to EU countries, the reeognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Turkeyand the presence of the Tursish troops on the island are two outstanding issues that could be settled. 38 From the Turkish perspective these questions could only be solved by the integral dialogue between the two communities. Internal sttlement achieved between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities could create a lasting peace in the island 39 .
However, Greece has tried to use its relation to the Community as an additional resource, a bargaining point, in the seulement of its disputes with Turkey. In this context, Greece has been lrying to use her membership as an instument in influencing Turkish behavior. As long as Greece feels that it can use the potential of the Community in affeeting Turkish behavior, and as long as other members o the Community insist that Turco-Greek problems should be seuled prior to the consideration of Turkish accession, there is no reason why Greece should lry to reach a compromise on any of the many problems it says it has with Turkey.40
Whereas according to Lesser, a political scientist, "as NATO moves through a period of uncertainty, the idea that Turkish involvement in the EC could serve to anchor 37For more details see, Şükrü Gürel. Tarihsel Boyut Içinde Türk Yunan ııişkileri (1821-1993) (Ankara: ümit Yay., 1993). 38Professor Dood, a Westem academician, noted that the Cyprus problem has always appeared as a major reason why Turkey cannotget in. Certainly the Greeks feel very strongly about that. Soon, a decision will be made about the entry of Greek Cyprus into the EV. ır that happens, i think it will be a disaster as far as Turkish and EV relations are concemed. it means that Turkey will be considered as a foreign occupier in Cyprus." Orya Sultan Halisdemir, Interview with Professor Clement Oood, Turkish Oaily News, . Section two. Friday. january 27, 1995. 39But from the Turkish side, the view that is stressed by the political scientists in the West. that resolution of the Cyrus problem would transform the overall elimate of Greek-Turkish relation and faciliate the seniement of more practical questions conceming air and sea space and resources in the aegean. is not convincig. Turkey is an implortant element of the Middle East sub-system as geographically and historically as well as a member of the Western alli~nce. So instabilities in the Middle East would inevitably affeet Turkey, although it has,been avoiding from regional troubles. So, a seeure and peaceful atmosphere should be created and maintained in its south. As long as Turkey is an implortant stability element, it, as a regional power, has also a capacitiy to play an assisting role in the future of Middle East peace. 44 The cumulative impact on Turkey of this improving dialogue with the conservatiove Arab states ad societies as well as Turkic states in the Central Asia and Caucasus region would improve Turkey's sen se of confgidence in itself as a credible regional power with improved diplomatic dexterity in the way it balances its foteign policy in the West. But it should be remembered that the long term implications of Turkey's intensive relations with the conservative regimes of the Middle East would inevitably raise questions in its relations with EU. 45 "Turkey's postition is complex. Ideologically and politically, Turkey is a part of the Westem community of nations. it is not onlyaNATO: ally, but also a member the COuncil of Europe and OECD, and hope ta join European,Community in the future. It is, however, predominantly, a Muslem country, though itl has a seeular policy with a special demoeratic tradition. Despite it is westem orientatior~and circumpsect policies, by geography and history, Turkey is an integrili part of the Middle Eastern syseun. Its diplomacy and security are intimately linked to the region and are affected by the developlents in the system. Dangers are felt directly. Some of the major threats to Turkey's internal and extemal security stern from conflicts and disturbances in the region. "46 .
Turkey should severely avoid a contradiction and conflict with the regionaly countries. Because, a conflict doesn't cause to gain something (not provide anything), but would harm for all countries in the region. "Despite all the unfavorable conditions, Ankara prefers to maintain a retient diplomacy to dea! with Syrla as well as with other Middle Eastern neighbors.... Although the river Euphrates provides a certain leverage ,on Syria. Ankara has never attempted to use it bluntly, and has cepeatedly assured Damascus that it has no intention of withholding the waters öf Euphrates for the purpose of inflicting damage to Syria."47 Turkey, ultimately, wants to see no change in the status quo and the balance of power in the region. Because, in the region everythinhg is celated to everything else and the boundaries dividing local,national, regional and international are bulurred.
Conclusion
During the Cold War years, in order to provide security for a countey, it was eventually, enough to be in the Westem of Eastem Block. Since a threak taken in to account as a threat toward all of the Block security, all member states could counter attack together possibly.
So, in order to seeure the independence and territorial integrity of a countey from the foreign attack, there was no need special diplomatic initiatives, and diplomatic skillful and knowledge. Basicall, the value of strategic position of a country was important for the Block and so, policies that is suitable to Bl,oc policy was enough. However, post Could War era, due to changes ,of lbalances and interests, states should decide new p;olicies and see some developents in advance. States must set up defense systems, modernize their mililary structureSand develop diplomati,cfactics from nowon. In this context, today, for states revising their foreign policyorganizations, and increasing organization structure is noı only a selecıion bul also a need.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war changed the global landscape and the dynamics of international relations. By the developments ended the cold war, its geography and geostrategic position provide to Turkey credibiliıy, bul also left her face to face by the new seeurity questions. Russia probably would like to have some influence over the regional policies, especially in the Caucasian and Central Asian states called as a "near abroad" by Russia. "Clearly, Turkey, is disıurbed al what it sees as a gradual return by Russia to a sphere-of-influence policy in the near abroad, a policy thaı would be grossly, incompatible with the independence of those countries. hold utmost imponance for Russian foreign policyand security interests. "48 In these condilions, the. custom s union accord signed between Tuikey and the EV was also welcomed by both sides. it would provide politicaı, militaey and economic advantages to the West as well' as Turkey. However, Turkey should e~entually overcome some difficullies such as human rights, democratizalion, kurdish problem and some uneasy problems with Greece.
. i
48For a broad analysis. see Sezer, op. cil., pp. 149-160.
